Highlights from the motions to dismiss the indictment against his Excellency, Bishop Robert Finn, D.D.
When it was announced in the news February 16th that the defense had filed motions, the supporters of "Justice for Bishop Finn", had to rely on the news outlets to characterize and list the defense motions. The defense motions illuminate the injustice of the case and can educate the populous, but where is the commentary on them from the media? They provide explicit evidence that the charges against our bishop should be dropped. The explanation of the defense motions published by The
STAR newspaper was buried within the paper and quite inadequate at recapping the motions of the defense for his Excellency. Neither have national news outlets adequately or even in the least mentioned that the defense motions have been filed.
Therefore, with a recent donation to our cause, we purchased a copy of the defense motions to dismiss. A more thorough recap by Michael Quinlan, attorney is forthcoming.
HIGHLIGHTS: Case No. 1116-CR04467:
Bishop Finn is charged under Missouri Statutes
210.115 and 352.400. The FIRST Motion states:
"Motion to dismiss indictment because sub-section 210.115 and 352.400 RSMoARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
ON THEIR FACE"
Page 1: Excerpt - "...because the statues under which he is charged, are unconstitutionally vague on the face of the statues in violation of Bishop Robert Finn's right to due process of law as guaranteed him pursuant to Sections 10, 1(a) and 19 of Article 1 of the Missouri Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution. Specifically, the phrases, "immediately report," and "a child may be subjected to abuse" do not provide fair warning of prohibited conduct, and, the conflicting standards of sub-section 210.115 "reasonable cause to suspect" and sub-section 352.400 "probably cause to believe" impermissibly faith to and establish a single standard for the police and public that sufficiently guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests."
Page 6: "The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine"...."1) A criminal statue is vague when it fails to give notice to potential offenders of the prohibited conduct, and notice is inadequate when the terms of the statue are so unclear that the people of common
intelligence must guess at their meaning.....2) A statute is also vague if it lacks explicit standards necessary to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application by the state." 3) Page 11: "A further illustration that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague, if the reporting statutes require the identity of a specific child, and that identity is not known, any delay in reporting to allow for an investigation to determine the identity of the child would presumably run afoul of the statutory requirement that a report be "immediately" filed. This is illustrative that the language is unconstitutionally vague on its face." 4) Page 14: "Finally, the charging document in this case if further illustration that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. As charged, the defendants are accused of failing to report suspected child abuse based on the conduct of Ratigan, NOT based upon the physical or behavioral observations regarding a particular child. None of the evidence that will be adduced in this case will focus on facts typically indicative of child abuse such as multiple injuries in different stages of healing, unexplained injuries, or sexualized behavior. In fact, no such evidence exists in this case. Rather, as charged, the focus in this case will be on the perceptions catered to Ratigan's interaction with children. The focus will be on Ratigan as a possible 'abuser,' and not focused on a particular child as victim of child abuse. This approach seems to run contrary to the statutory language requiring a report to be made when there is reasonable cause to suspect a child has been or may be subjected to abuse. To the extent the statutory language allows a prosecutor to pursue a criminal charge for failure to report when there is reasonable cause to suspect a person may be an abuser, such interpretation is not clear on the face of the statute"....
Page 9: ."The Missouri and United States Constitutions are intolerant of vagueness when applying criminal statutes
because of the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement."..."the term 'immediately' vests in the prosecuting attorney unbridled discretion to determine whether a report of suspected child abuse was made quickly enough to satisfy the mandate. The statue fails to inform a mandated reporter or the designated agent what conduct will render them liable for criminal sanctions. Thus the statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Sheriff, Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766 P.2d 896, 104 Nev. 747,749 (Nev. 1988)."...
SECOND Motion to dismiss indictment for FAILURE TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT GRAND JURY.
THIRD Motion to dismiss indictment because sub-section 210.115 and 352.400 RSMo
ARE UNCONSITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED. (note the first one as "vague on its 'face').
Additional - Motion to "SEVER PARTIES" - "...to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, The Catholic Diocese of Kansas City - St. Joseph." Page 27: "Bishop Finn is not the "designated reporter" for the Diocese."....."Under Missouri statute a minister is relieved of his legal obligation to report suspected child abuse once the church's designated agent becomes aware (1) the
suspected child abuse and (2) the fact that no report has been made." Page 32: "A review of the discovery indicates that it would be reasonable for a jury to find that Bishop Finn was not the designated agent of the Diocese that was required to report child abuse."
These are some of the highlights. Each motion is backed up by the defense attorney's arguments and citations from other
cases to show precedence where available.
STAR newspaper was buried within the paper and quite inadequate at recapping the motions of the defense for his Excellency. Neither have national news outlets adequately or even in the least mentioned that the defense motions have been filed.
Therefore, with a recent donation to our cause, we purchased a copy of the defense motions to dismiss. A more thorough recap by Michael Quinlan, attorney is forthcoming.
HIGHLIGHTS: Case No. 1116-CR04467:
Bishop Finn is charged under Missouri Statutes
210.115 and 352.400. The FIRST Motion states:
"Motion to dismiss indictment because sub-section 210.115 and 352.400 RSMoARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
ON THEIR FACE"
Page 1: Excerpt - "...because the statues under which he is charged, are unconstitutionally vague on the face of the statues in violation of Bishop Robert Finn's right to due process of law as guaranteed him pursuant to Sections 10, 1(a) and 19 of Article 1 of the Missouri Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution. Specifically, the phrases, "immediately report," and "a child may be subjected to abuse" do not provide fair warning of prohibited conduct, and, the conflicting standards of sub-section 210.115 "reasonable cause to suspect" and sub-section 352.400 "probably cause to believe" impermissibly faith to and establish a single standard for the police and public that sufficiently guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests."
Page 6: "The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine"...."1) A criminal statue is vague when it fails to give notice to potential offenders of the prohibited conduct, and notice is inadequate when the terms of the statue are so unclear that the people of common
intelligence must guess at their meaning.....2) A statute is also vague if it lacks explicit standards necessary to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application by the state." 3) Page 11: "A further illustration that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague, if the reporting statutes require the identity of a specific child, and that identity is not known, any delay in reporting to allow for an investigation to determine the identity of the child would presumably run afoul of the statutory requirement that a report be "immediately" filed. This is illustrative that the language is unconstitutionally vague on its face." 4) Page 14: "Finally, the charging document in this case if further illustration that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. As charged, the defendants are accused of failing to report suspected child abuse based on the conduct of Ratigan, NOT based upon the physical or behavioral observations regarding a particular child. None of the evidence that will be adduced in this case will focus on facts typically indicative of child abuse such as multiple injuries in different stages of healing, unexplained injuries, or sexualized behavior. In fact, no such evidence exists in this case. Rather, as charged, the focus in this case will be on the perceptions catered to Ratigan's interaction with children. The focus will be on Ratigan as a possible 'abuser,' and not focused on a particular child as victim of child abuse. This approach seems to run contrary to the statutory language requiring a report to be made when there is reasonable cause to suspect a child has been or may be subjected to abuse. To the extent the statutory language allows a prosecutor to pursue a criminal charge for failure to report when there is reasonable cause to suspect a person may be an abuser, such interpretation is not clear on the face of the statute"....
Page 9: ."The Missouri and United States Constitutions are intolerant of vagueness when applying criminal statutes
because of the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement."..."the term 'immediately' vests in the prosecuting attorney unbridled discretion to determine whether a report of suspected child abuse was made quickly enough to satisfy the mandate. The statue fails to inform a mandated reporter or the designated agent what conduct will render them liable for criminal sanctions. Thus the statute is unconstitutionally vague. See Sheriff, Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766 P.2d 896, 104 Nev. 747,749 (Nev. 1988)."...
SECOND Motion to dismiss indictment for FAILURE TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT GRAND JURY.
THIRD Motion to dismiss indictment because sub-section 210.115 and 352.400 RSMo
ARE UNCONSITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED. (note the first one as "vague on its 'face').
Additional - Motion to "SEVER PARTIES" - "...to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, The Catholic Diocese of Kansas City - St. Joseph." Page 27: "Bishop Finn is not the "designated reporter" for the Diocese."....."Under Missouri statute a minister is relieved of his legal obligation to report suspected child abuse once the church's designated agent becomes aware (1) the
suspected child abuse and (2) the fact that no report has been made." Page 32: "A review of the discovery indicates that it would be reasonable for a jury to find that Bishop Finn was not the designated agent of the Diocese that was required to report child abuse."
These are some of the highlights. Each motion is backed up by the defense attorney's arguments and citations from other
cases to show precedence where available.
